According to German legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch, laws that are substantively unjust to an intolerable degree should not be regarded as legally valid, even if they were promulgated according to stipulated procedure. Radbruch’s Formula (as his position has been termed) contradicts the central tenet of legal positivism, according to which the existence of laws does not necessarily depend on their merit.1 While some legal positivists suppose that legal invalidity based on the content of particular laws is a central tenet of (...) natural law theory,2 natural law theorists such as John Finnis opine that the lex injusta non est lex3 maxim has been no more than a subordinate theorem of classical natural law theory.4 In Finnis’s view, unjust laws give rise to legal obligation “in a legal sense.”5. (shrink)

This article examines the findings of an empirical study of law students from the Singapore Management University on their internship experiences at private law firms. As internships are frequently undertaken by law students, it is necessary for stakeholders to understand their impact on the values and ideals of law students in relation to the law and legal practice. This article seeks to increase the consciousness of law school educators, lawyers, and the professional bar about how law firm internships are contributing (...) to the making of future lawyers, so as to facilitate the reflection by these parties as to their roles in shaping future lawyers. (shrink)

Little is known and understood about ethics management or the development of formal, systematic, and goal-directed initiatives to improve ethics in the public relations workplace. This study found little ethics training and written guidelines in the public relations workplace. Organizational ethics initiatives are poorly communicated to practitioners and rely mostly on punitive restraints with little reward for ethical behavior. For many practitioners, ethics is not learned through workplace ethics initiatives but rather is mostly informed by external influences including personal values, (...) family upbringing, and professional work experiences. (shrink)

In adopting a deontological lens to assess message ethicality, this study identifies and explicates the ethical dimensions of fast food advertising through five principles of the TARES framework of persuasion ethics. In moral weight, fast food—with its high calories and low nutritional value—is negatively prejudiced. A deontological-ethical perspective, by focusing on the quality of the advertising message, shifts the focus from the product to a more measured deliberation about the moral responsibility of fast food advertisers to reposition them as moral (...) agents who are accountable for their messages. A content analysis of 380 television and print ads for fast food in Singapore shows that few ads met the TARES's expectations. Ads targeting children and teenagers are associated with lower message ethicality than ads targeting adults and the general audience, lending empirical support to the literature critical of fast food advertising's insidious approach of targeting the young. (shrink)

In a Web-based survey of 740 investigative journalists, competition and medium emerge as the 2 most salient predictors of journalists' tolerance of deception. Journalists who view competition as an important consideration in ethical decision making are more tolerant of deception. Television journalists have a higher tolerance of deception than print journalists. Overall, organizational factors such as medium and organization size are better predictors of deception tolerance than individual-level variables such as age, education, work experience, journalism as a college major, or (...) media ethics instruction. (shrink)

This study examines truthfulness through eight dimensions to explicate truth in health communication and explores the relationships between message truthfulness and message attributes and audience characteristics. A content analysis of 974 television antismoking ads from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reveals a high degree of truthfulness. Message truthfulness is related to thematic frames, emotion appeals, source, age, social role and smoking status, and positive framing of consequences. Ads targeted at teens/youth and smokers tend to have lower message truthfulness than (...) ads targeting older age groups and non-smokers. Ads with humor and fear appeals are found to be less truthful. (shrink)

Hermann Weyl succeeded in presenting a consistent overarching analysis that accounts for symmetry in material artifacts, natural phenomena, and physical theories. Weyl showed that group theory is the underlying mathematical structure for symmetry in all three domains. But in this study Weyl did not include appeals to symmetry arguments which, for example, Einstein expressed as “for reasons of symmetry”. An argument typically takes the form of a set of premises and rules of inference that lead to a conclusion. Symmetry may (...) enter an argument both in the premises and the rules of inference, and the resulting conclusion may also exhibit symmetrical properties. Taking our cue from Pierre Curie, we distinguish two categories of symmetry arguments, axiomatic and heuristic; they will be defined and then illustrated by historical cases. (shrink)

The year 2009 marks the 400th anniversary of the publication of one of the most revolutionary scientific texts ever written. In this book, appropriately entitled, Astronomia nova, Johannes Kepler developed an astronomical theory which departs fundamentally from the systems of Ptolemy and Copernicus. One of the great innovations of this theory is its dependence on the science of optics. The declared goal of Kepler in his earlier publication, Paralipomena to Witelo whereby The Optical Part of Astronomy is Treated, was to (...) solve difficulties and expose illusions astronomers face when conducting astronomical observations with optical instruments. To avoid observational errors that had plagued the antiquated measuring techniques for calculating the apparent diameter and angular position of the luminaries, Kepler designed a novel device: the ecliptic instrument. In this paper we seek to shed light on the role optical instruments play in Kepler's scheme: they impose constraints on theory, but at the same time render astronomical knowledge secure. To get a comprehensive grasp of Kepler's astonishing achievements it is required to widen the approach to his writings and study Kepler not only as a mathematico-physical astronomer, but also as a designer of instruments and a practicing observer. (shrink)

In response to recent scholarship on the need for universal professional values, a call that has intensified in the post-9/11 world, this article reports how journalists in Asia and the Middle East conceptualize universal professional values and the possible impact of a universal ethics code. In general, the journalists interviewed for this study were suspicious of a Western-imposed set of values or a code. However, they agreed on a core set of values, ones that de-emphasized truth telling in relation to (...) respect and the need to maintain a community. They also emphasized that different political systems make the implementation of a universal code problematic. However, there was great agreement on the need for such discussion within the profession and on the commonalities such discussion reveals. (shrink)

As climate change continues to be a pressing issue affecting businesses, firms are taking proactive measures by integrating carbon considerations into their overall strategic planning for environmental sustainability. Nonetheless, the question of whether it pays to be green remains inconclusively answered. Based on an analysis of the 200 largest public listed firms by market capitalisation in Malaysia, the findings indicated that most of the firms are still reactive in managing their carbon activities; however, corporate carbon strategy does, indeed, lead to (...) better financial performance. The findings reaffirmed that going green pays off, particularly for firms with higher levels of foreign ownership. Interestingly, an inverse relationship was observed among firms with higher levels of government shareholdings. Additionally, the firms have been categorised into six different groups based on their scope and level of corporate carbon strategies, ranging from “wait-and-see” to “all-round explorer” classifications. Taken together, these findings enrich corporate carbon and sustainability literature and offer insights into theoretical and policy implications, along with suggestions for future research. (shrink)

T. M. Scanlon’s contractualism is a meta-ethical theory that explains moral motivation and also provides a conception of how to carry out moral deliberation. It supports non-consequentialism – the theory that both consequences and deontological considerations are morally significant in moral deliberation. Regarding the issue of punishment, non-consequentialism allows us to take account of the need for deterrence as well as principles of fairness, justice, and even desert. Moreover, Scanlonian contractualism accounts for permissibility in terms of justifiability: An act is (...) permissible if and only if it can be justified to everyone affected by it. This contractualist thesis explains why it is always impermissible to frame an innocent person, why vicarious punishment is impermissible, and why there has to be a cap on sentences. Contractualism therefore allows us to take deterrence as a goal of punishment without the excess of utilitarianism. This paper further argue that the resulting view is superior to pure retributivism. Finally, it shows why legal excuses and mitigation can be justified in terms of the notion of negative desert. (For access to this paper: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/sJ2JBVXkztyFMGmxS7tS/full ) . (shrink)

This paper explores the ethical and conceptual implications of the findings from an empirical study (reported elsewhere) of decision-making capacity in anorexia nervosa. In the study, ten female patients aged thirteen to twenty-one years with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, and eight sets of parents, took part in semistructured interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to identify aspects of thinking that might be relevant to the issue of competence to refuse treatment. All the patient-participants were also tested using the (...) MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—Treatment test of competence. This is a formalized, structured, interviewer-administered test of competence, which is a widely accepted clinical tool for determining capacity. The young women also completed five brief, self-administered questionnaires to assess their levels of psychopathology. The issues identified from the interviews are described under two headings: difficulties with thought processing and changes in values. The results suggest that competence to refuse treatment may be compromised in people with anorexia nervosa in ways that are not captured by traditional legal approaches. (shrink)

McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier (2020) state that the Christian bioethical categories, namely sin, human dignity, and the common good, can shed light on bioethical issues, whereas secular bioethics may...

This book explores and elaborates three theories of public reason, drawn from Rawlsian political liberalism, natural law theory, and Confucianism. Drawing together academics from these separate approaches, the volume explores how the three theories critique each other, as well as how each one brings its theoretical arsenal to bear on the urgent contemporary debate of medical assistance in dying. The volume is structured in two parts: an exploration of the three traditions, followed by an in-depth overview of the conceptual and (...) historical background. In Part I, the three comprehensive opening chapters are supplemented by six dynamic chapters in dialogue with each other, each author responding to the other two traditions, and subsequently reflecting on the possible deficiencies of their own theories. The chapters in Part II cover a broad range of subjects, from an overview of the history of bioethics to the nature of autonomy and its status as a moral and political value. In its entirety, the volume provides a vibrant and exemplary collaborative resource to scholars interested in the role of public reason and its relevance in bioethical debate. (shrink)

In two recent papers, Mr Robert Young maintains that all attempts by philosophers to bolster the-violation-of-law concept of miracles are bound to fail and propounds what he claims to be a novel non-reductivist concept of miracles which avoids the conceptual difficulties of the violation-model. His view of miracles is of god being ‘an active agent-factor in the set of factors which actually was causally operative’ [p. 123] in an event dubbed a miracle. God is put in among ‘the plurality of (...) causes’ [p. 122, S p. 33] that could determine the event, but if he acts in a miracle, then ‘his presence…alters the outcome from what it would have been if, contrary to fact , he had not been present’ [p. 122]. Young claims that his concept ‘is neither a violation of … laws nor is it a coincidental occurrence religiously interpreted’ [p. 122, S p. 33], and so it avoids the difficulties, which he thinks are faced by the violation-model, of having an intelligible notion of an occurrence of the physically impossible, and also the reductivism inherent in taking mere coincidences as miracles. He also suggests a procedure of settling the epistemological issue regarding particular alleged miracles, an inquiry he thinks he has made possible by having first given a sense to miracles. [p. 126]. (shrink)

Ethics is frequently concerned with how to resolve clashes between competing claims from claimants of different kinds. The idea of moral status is crucial to understanding how (1) competing claims...

What is social entrepreneurship? In, particular, what’s so social about it? Understanding what social entrepreneurship is enables researchers to study the phenomenon and policy-makers to design measures to encourage it. However, such an understanding is lacking partly because there is no universally accepted definition of entrepreneurship as yet. In this paper, we suggest a definition of social entrepreneurship that intuitively accords with what is generally accepted as entrepreneurship and that captures the way in which entrepreneurship may be altruistic. Based on (...) this we provide a taxonomy of social entrepreneurship and identify a number of real cases from Asia illustrating the different forms it could take. (shrink)

Summary We offer a novel historical-philosophical framework for discussing experimental practice which we call ‘Generating Experimental Knowledge’. It combines three different perspectives: experimental systems, concept formation, and the pivotal role of error. We then present an historical account of the invention of the Scanning Tunnelling Microscope (STM), or Raster-Tunnelmikroskop, and interpret it within the proposed framework. We show that at the outset of the STM project, Binnig and Rohrer—the inventors of the machine—filed two patent disclosures; the first is dated 22 (...) December 1978 (Switzerland), and the second, two years later, 12 September 1980 (US). By studying closely these patent disclosures, the attempts to realize them, and the subsequent development of the machine, we present, within the framework of generating experimental knowledge, a new account of the invention of the STM. While the realization of the STM was still a long way off, the patent disclosures served as blueprints, marking the changes that had to be introduced on the way from the initial idea to its realization. (shrink)

This book examines the institutional development of Chinese sociology from the 1890s to the present. It plots the discipline’s twisting path in the Chinese context, from early Western influences; through the institutionalization of the discipline in the 1930s-40s; its problematic relationship with socialism and interruptions under Marxist orthodoxy and the Cultural Revolution; its revival during the 1980s-90s; to the twin trends of globalization and indigenization in current Chinese sociological scholarship. Chen argues that in spite of the state-building agenda and persistent (...) efforts to indigenize the discipline, the Western model remains pervasively influential, due in large part to the influence of American missionaries, foundations and scholars in the formation and transformation of the Chinese sociological tradition. The history of Chinese sociology is shown to be a contingent process in which globally circulated knowledge, above all the American sociological tradition, has been adapted to the changing contexts of China. This engaging work contributes an important country study to the history of sociology and will appeal to scholars of Chinese history and disciplinary historiography, in addition to social scientists. (shrink)

It is a truism that there are erroneous convictions in criminal trials. Recent legal findings show that 3.3% to 5%of all convictions in capital rape-murder cases in the U.S. in the 1980s were erroneous convictions. Given this fact, what normative conclusions can be drawn? First, the article argues that a moderately revised version of Scanlon’ s contractualism offers an attractive moral vision that is different from utilitarianism or other consequentialist theories, or from purely deontological theories. It then brings this version (...) of Scanlonian contractualism to bear on the question of whether the death penalty, life imprisonment, long sentences, or shorter sentences can be justified, given that there is a non-negligible rate of erroneous conviction. Contractualism holds that a permissible act must be justifiable to everyone affected by it. Yet, given the non-negligible rate of erroneous conviction, it is unjustifiable to mete out the death penalty, because such a punishment is not justifiable to innocent murder convicts. It is further argued that life imprisonment will probably not be justified (unless lowering the sentence to a long sentence will drastically increase the murder rate). However, whether this line of argument could be further extended would depend on the impact of lowering sentences on communal security. (shrink)

Communication programs seek to cultivate students who become professionals not only with expertise in their chosen field, but also ethical awareness. The current study investigates how exposure to ethics instruction and internship experiences may influence communication students’ ethical perceptions, including ideological orientations on idealism and relativism, as well as awareness of contemporary ethical issues related to social media and artificial intelligence (AI). The effects were also assessed on students’ support for general uses of AI for communication practices and adoption of (...) generative AI, specifically ChatGPT. The survey results based on a student sample in Taiwan show that internship experience is more significant than ethics instruction on swaying ethical perceptions and behavioral inclinations of adopting AI applications. Adding to the limited body of knowledge on the effect of ethics education and internship programs, the findings also offer insights for how communication education can address emerging ethical challenges brought by new technology. (shrink)

I offer some reasons for the theory that, compared with human beings, non-human animals have some but lesser intrinsic value. On the basis of this theory, I first argue that we do not know how to compare an animal's claim to be free from a more serious type of harm, and a human's claim to be free from some lesser type of harm. For we need to take account of these parties' intrinsic value, and their competing types of claim. Yet, (...) there exists no known way for making such comparison, when a human's intrinsic value is higher than that of an animal, whereas the type of claim an animal has is morally weightier than the type of claim a human has. Second, I explain why utilitarianism is unhelpful in making such comparison. Third, in the case where some animals can be sacrificed for saving a larger number of humans, it is crucial to ask whether animals have the right to life, and I argue that this question is more perplexing than we might think. My conclusion is that the various difficulties mentioned above have a deeper source than we have so far acknowledged, and that this reflects that the moral reality is less tidy and more complex than many theories portray. (shrink)

It is a truism that there are erroneous convictions in criminal trials. Recent legal findings show that 3.3% to 5% of all convictions in capital rape-murder cases in the U.S. in the 1980s were erro...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Decision-Making as a Broader ConceptJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)KeywordsCompetence, decision-making, capacity, anorexia nervosa, autonomy, values, identityWe thank Demian Whiting for the thoughtful critique of aspects of our paper (Tan et al. 2006a). A primary aim of our research was to provide empirical grounds on which to stimulate discussion about the nature of decision-making capacity (DMC). Whiting criticizes in particular the concept of (...) 'pathological values' that we suggested might be relevant in the assessment of DMC and in the related issue of deciding when a patient's refusal of beneficial treatment should be overridden.Whiting's central concern is with DMC. Whiting argues that the absence of pathological values should not be a criterion for DMC. We are unclear whether he is also arguing that pathological values do not provide a reason of any kind for overriding treatment refusal. At the end of the paper he writes: "we cannot justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values... on the grounds that these patients lack DMC" (2009, XX). This seems to leave open the possibility that we may be able to justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values on grounds other than that they lack DMC. As we wrote in our response to the discussants of our original paper, "The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests" (Tan et al. 2006b, 300).In deciding on whether to use compulsory treatment, there are other relevant factors that may need to be considered, such as the seriousness of the decision, which determines the threshold for competence. However, in this response we consider three issues. First, we argue that the current concept of DMC is by no means so clear cut or generally agreed upon as Whiting implies, and that some of the lack of clarity relates to pathological values. Second, that the concept of DMC is itself dependent on accounts of autonomy, and that it is plausible that pathological values can affect autonomy. Third, we directly consider the question of whether a coherent account of pathological values might be given based on a concept of authenticity.The Current Criteria for DMCWhiting argues that the current criteria for DMC are correct and that an additional criterion along the lines of absence of pathological values should not be added. This argument assumes that there is a clear and agreed understanding of the current criteria. We believe this is not the case for three reasons.(i) Whiting begins his account of DMC by saying that it is normally taken to include: "(1) [End Page 345] understanding (and appreciation)" (2009, 341). Already there is an area of dispute, and the use of parentheses reflects this. The concept of 'appreciation' was developed by Grisso and Applebaum (Grisso, Appelbaum, and Hill-Fotouhi 1997). It is not included in either English common law development, for example (ReC), nor in the criteria specified in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. More important, Grisso and Appelbaum in their comment on our original paper (2006) argue that our work advances thinking about 'appreciation' rather than requiring that we add new elements. The implication is that they believe that what we have called pathological values are relevant to the assessment of capacity and are already included in an account of capacity that incorporates the criterion of 'appreciation.' In our response, we argued that pathological values are not entirely captured within the account of appreciation that Grisso and Appelbaum had previously given. We do not want to revisit that issue here, but the point of relevance is that on one view (that of Grisso and Appelbaum) pathological values are already included in the current criteria for DMC as part of the concept of appreciation, whereas on Whiting's view they are not.(ii) Even if there were agreement over the wording and concepts relevant to DMC there is a further important issue: how are those concepts... (shrink)

Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. offers erudite and compelling arguments for the view that all families should try to realize the traditional family. Although I tend to agree with him from my personal standpoint, I doubt that this view can be justified to those with whom we are in reasonable disagreement about the family. I make three critical points. First, though Engelhardt stops short of saying that the state should encourage people to form traditonal families, or discourage those who do not, some (...) state perfectionists might do so. From the perspective of public reason, it is unjust for the state to favor some conceptions of the good over others, if these conceptions are all reasonable. Moreover, those whose conceptions of the good are not favored would feel that they are disrespected. Second, insofar as Engelhardt thinks that all families should try to realize the traditional families, the traditional family would not be a good to those who do not like children. Moreover, it would be difficult to persuade those who have decided not to have children for reasons of career, burden, or more altruistic concern. Third, against Engelhardt’s stance against the “egalitarian aspirations” of liberalism, I argue that too often women sacrifice their possible careers for the sake of the family, even should they hold advanced degrees from prestigious universities, or professional qualifications. This kind of injustice is too uncomfortable to ignore. (shrink)

This paper examines whether physician-assisted suicide is morally permissible, and whether it should be legalised in the sense that those seeking or performing such procedure will be immune from prosecution. The issues of moral and legal permissibility1 are closely connected. One way to argue for the permissibility of PAS is grounded in the argument that a patient has the right to refuse life-saving equipment, or to have it withdrawn,2 and then to further argue that there is no relevant distinction between (...) refusal/withdrawal and PAS, if the patient consents. This is essentially the argument raised in “The Philosophers’ Brief ”, filed by six distinguished philosophers. However, this argument has been soundly criticised. Frances Kamm points out that the general claim on which Dworkin et al. rely—that there is no moral difference per se between killing and letting die—is false. This is because a patient has the right to refuse treatment even when this is against his interest because the alternative would be forced treatment, but it is not true to say that a patient has the right to PAS even when it is against his interest. Also at issue is the Doctrine of Double Effect, according to which there is a moral distinction between an action that is intended to cause death and one that is merely foreseen to cause death. [End Page 224] In section I of this paper, I shall argue against DDE, which purports to disallow PAS but not refusal/withdrawal. I shall argue that since it is permissible for a physician to prescribe morphine to a patient suffering excruciating pain, it is also permissible for her to prescribe such a drug to a patient suffering pain, with the intention that he be killed and hence relieved of the suffering. The grounds on which I rely is the thesis that intention is irrelevant to permissibility, as proposed by Judith Thomson and T.M. Scanlon. In section II, I shall discuss David Velleman’s argument that termination of life is morally impermissible. I proceed to examine in section III the theoretical version of the Slippery Slope Argument. In section IV, I shall consider the practical version of the Slippery Slope Argument. In section V, I shall discuss other consequentialist objections to the legalisation of PAS. In the final section, I shall consider the view that even if PAS is morally permissible, it does not follow that it should be legalised. The argument I consider is the consequentialist one that legalising PAS may have a very different significance—when we consider the total consequences—than if there is only a single act of PAS, considered in isolation. While I agree that consequences are generally very important, I shall argue that we should approach the issue from a contractualist rather than a utilitarian perspective.3. (shrink)

I argue that "quality of life" can be understood in three main ways: as purchasing power, together with social and political goods; as the subjective state of mind: happiness; happiness as related to the meaningfulness of one's profession or cause.

This paper is concerned with the problem of experimental error. The prevalent view that experimental errors can be dismissed as a tiresome but trivial blemish on the method of experimentation is criticized. It is stressed that the occurrence of errors in experiments constitutes a permanent feature of the attempt to test theories in the physical world, and this feature deserves proper attention. It is suggested that a classification of types of experimental error may be useful as a heuristic device in (...) studying the nature of these errors. However, the standard classification of systematic and random errors is mathematically based does not focus on the causes of the errors, their origins, or the contexts in which they arise. A new typology of experimental errors is therefore proposed whose criterion is epistemological. This typology reflects the various stages that can be discerned in the execution of an experiment, each stage constituting a category of a certain type of experimental error. The proposed classification consists of four categories which are illustrated by historical cases. (shrink)

This study of the concept of orbit is intended to throw light on the nature of revolutionary concepts in science. We observe that Kepler transformed theoretical astronomy that was understood in terms of orbs [Latin: orbes] and models , by introducing a single term, orbit [Latin: orbita], that is, the path of a planet in space resulting from the action of physical causes expressed in laws of nature. To demonstrate the claim that orbit is a revolutionary concept we pursue three (...) lines of argument. First we trace the origin of the term; second, we document its development and specify the meaning of the novel term as it was introduced into astronomy by Kepler in his Astronomia nova . Finally, in order to establish in what sense the concept is revolutionary, we pay attention to the enduring impact that the concept has had on the relevant sciences, in this case astronomy and indeed physics. We claim that orbit is an instance of a revolutionary concept whose provenance and use can provide the insights we are seeking. (shrink)

Bioethical issues are perplexing, profound, and politically divisive. The Lanson Lectures in Bioethics Series was founded in the belief that philosophical elucidation can clarify the nature of these difficult issues, and can lead to their resolution. The present volume collects the first five previously unpublished lectures delivered by five preeminent moral philosophers between 2016 and 2022. Drawing a distinction between two concepts of dignity, Jonathan Glover brings the distinction to bear on the issues of assisted suicide, embryo research, and genetic (...) choices. F. M. Kamm argues that doctors are morally permitted to intentionally cause death, or assist in its being intentionally caused, when either death is imminent anyway and intentionally causing it can alone stop the pain, or if the patient has already decided—not unreasonably—that death is his least bad option. On the question whether smokers who contract lung cancer are entitled to state-supported healthcare, T. M. Scanlon argues that the reasons that individuals have for wanting to engage in risky activities need to be compared with the relevant costs society has to bear to provide healthcare for those who suffer illness or injury as a result of these activities. Contrary to P. F. Strawson’s view that a psychiatrist can only “treat” an insane patient, Victor Tadros argues that it is often right to reason with, and communicate to, (nonresponsible) mentally ill persons. Peter Singer discusses questions pertinent to pandemics: How to distribute scarce medical resources and vaccines ethically? Whether to relax the standard for volunteers willing to participate in vaccines research? How to compare the trade-off between saving lives and saving the economy regarding lockdowns? How to prevent pandemics in future? These lectures are followed by critical commentaries by Alastair Campbell, Chun-Yan Tse, Peter Chau, Derek Baker, and Alexandre Erler respectively. Each commentary (except the inaugural lecture) is followed by a rejoinder. This book shows how moral philosophy can be brought to bear on bioethical issues by some of the best philosophical minds of our times. (shrink)

Qoheleth's theology concerns the practical realities of life and how one can cope in a topsy-turvy world. He espouses an ethic of liberality and enjoyment in the face of uncertainty.

The fact that half of the world is ruled under the banner of Marxism and that there were no easily comprehensible and thorough studies of Marxist theory of law makes it worth investigating in some detail whether there is a Marxian theory of law, and, if so, what a Marxian theory of law would be like. Although Marx's and Engels' writings broadly relevant to law amount to some two hundred pages, it is clear that in these writings neither Marx nor (...) Engels has put forward anything like a theory of law. If there is a Marxian theory of law to be discovered, it would have to be extracted, extrapolated and reconstructed from these writings. ;The reconstruction undertaken here has turned out to be fruitful. It seeks to demystify and explain the phenomenon of law. It is argued that one major function of law is to promote and stabilize the economic realm of society, and that law exists in order that the economic realm can be developed. And hence the various features of law as a whole are to be explained functionally by the needs and dynamics of the economic realm. ;The second, equally vital, role of law is its class character. It is argued that there is a ruling class in pre-socialist societies, and that the ruling class uses the law to maintain and further its own interest. How the law is used as a ruling-class instrument is examined in some detail. ;Further, it is explained how various legal ideas are delusive, and how the process of trial is prone to the pervasiveness of the dominant ideology. It is shown that many phenomena in law cannot be satisfactorily accounted for except via a Marxian perspective. Especially true is the absence of a starvation defence in criminal law. For if there is the provocation defence, an analogous reasoning makes the case for a starvation defence compelling. And while the absence of the starvation defence cannot be justified, it can be explained on a Marxian perspective. ;The focus of the dissertation is on the law in capitalist societies, especially in England, because Marx and Engels wrote mostly on the English society, and because the development of law reaches its highest point in capitalism. Another reason is that the author is most familiar with English law. (shrink)

Bioethical issues are practically urgent, politically divisive, and call for resolutions. They often involve questions that are perplexing, deep, and profound. To deal with them adequately requires philosophical tools and imagination. The Lanson Lectures in Bioethics were founded upon the belief that philosophical elucidation can clarify the nature of these difficult issues, and can lead to their resolution. The present volume collects the first five lectures delivered by five preeminent moral philosophers between 2016 and 2022. In the inaugural lecture, Jonathan (...) Glover draws a distinction between two conceptions of dignity, and brings it to bear on the issues of assisted suicide, embryo research, and genetic choices. F. M. Kamm argues that doctors are morally permitted to intentionally cause death, or assist in its being intentionally caused, when either death is imminent anyway and intentionally causing it can alone stop the pain, or if the patient has already decided—not unreasonably—that death is his least bad option. Are smokers who contract lung cancer entitled to state-supported healthcare? T. M. Scanlon argues that the reasons that individuals have for wanting to have the opportunity to engage in activities involving risks need to be compared with the costs society has to bear to provide healthcare for those who suffer illness or injury as a result of these activities. Rejecting Strawson’s view that a psychiatrist can only “treat” an insane patient, Victor Tadros argues that it is often right to reason with (nonresponsible) mentally ill persons because a psychiatrist needs to see things from their perspectives, and that we should communicate to nonresponsible agents that their wrongdoing is a problem for them and for their victims. Peter Singer proposes solutions to the following questions: How to distribute scarce medical resources and vaccines ethically? Whether to relax the standard for volunteers willing to participate in vaccines research? How to compare the trade-off between saving lives and saving the economy regarding lockdowns? How to prevent pandemics in future? Each lecture is followed by a critical commentary by a moral philosophers or physician in Asia. Each commentary (except the inaugural lecture) is followed by a rejoinder. (shrink)

I argue that the personhood of a fetus is analogous to the the heap. If this is correct, then the moral status or intrinsic value of a fetus would be supervenient upon the fetus's biological development. Yet to compare its claim vis-a-vis its mother's, we need to consider not only their moral status, but also the type of claim they each have. Thus we have to give weight to the two factors or variables of the mother's moral status and her (...) claim to some lesser good . And then we have to consider the fetus's lesser moral status and its claim to some greater good, namely, life. I argue that we do not know how to compare these two-variable claims. This also explains why the central cases of abortion have been so difficult to resolve. I suggest that the problem of animal rights has a similar structure. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 136-138.

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I explain the foundational differences between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, despite the fact that Rawls maintains the Two Principles of Justice in both works. Moreover, I expound why, in view of the fact that reasonable people would subscribe to different comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines, Rawls needs a new foundation for social stability in a constitutional liberal democracy. I explain the connection between Rawls’ ideas of (...) overlapping consensus, political conception, and public reason. Moreover, I explain Rawls’ idea of “duty of civility” and the condition under which a controversial issue can be legitimately resolved by way of voting. Further, instead of pursuing Rawls’ idea that bioethical issues could be resolved by way of “reasonable balancing” of “political values,” I turn to T. M. Scanlon’s contractualist approach, which is congenial to Rawlsian political liberalism and can resolve moral, political, and bioethical issues. In the second part of this chapter, I try to resolve the problem of medical assistance in dying by using Thomson’s/Scanlon’s idea that permissibility is not affected by intention. I deal with the Slippery Slope Arguments, the argument from abuse, and the argument from pressure on elderly patients who might feel obligated to die. Finally, I argue that Scanlonian contractualism is preferable to utilitarianism, and that contractualism can defuse the problem from pressure which has plagued utilitarianism. (shrink)

In this chapter, Li argues against the Natural Law Theory approach expounded by Farrell and Tham in Chap. 2. Li also explains why Fan’s version of Confucianism in Chap. 3 is problematic. Li concludes that neither Farrell and Tham, nor Fan, have successfully argued that medical assistance in dying is impermissible.